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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PrimalScreams (U.S. v. Stevens)
"[A] kitten, secured to the ground, watches and shrieks in pain as
a woman thrusts her high-heeled shoe into its body, slams her heel into
the kitten's eye socket and mouth loudly fracturing its skull, and stomps
repeatedly on the animal's head. The kitten hemorrhages blood, screams
blindly in pain, and is ultimately left dead in a moist pile of blood-soaked
hair and bone."I
This horrific behavior arouses certain people who will buy
videos depicting such torture and killing of "helpless animals, including
cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters." 2 Although such behavior is
typically illegal under state law, the videos rarely disclose the identities
of the criminals involved.3 Because of this, Congress recognized that
prosecution of the crime itself is difficult.4 However, Congress
recognized that law enforcement could identify the videos' vendors.5 In
1999, Congress therefore enacted 18 U.S.C. §48 (hereafter "Section 48")
to criminalize certain depictions of unlawful animal cruelty and thereby
reduce the demand for both the depictions and the depicted illegal
conduct.
As quoted by the Court, Section 48 provided in full:
§ 48. Depiction of animal cruelty

1. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1598 (2010)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae The Humane Society of the
United States in Support of Petitioner at 2, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
130 S .Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at *2).
2. Stevens, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct at 1583 (majority opinion).
3. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1603 (Alito, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1598; 145 CONG. REC. S15220 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
1999) (statement of Sen. Robert Smith); 145 CONG. REC. H10267 (daily ed. Oct. 19,
1999) (statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly).
5. 145 CONG. REC. H10267 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Spencer Bachus).
6. Stevens, 559 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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(a) CREATION, SALE, OR POSSESSION.-Whoever
knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction
of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that
depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for
commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) EXCEPTION.-Subsection (a) does not apply to
any depiction that has serious religious, political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or
artistic value.
(c) DEFINITIONS.-In this section(1) the term "depiction of animal cruelty" means
any visual or auditory depiction, including any
photograph, motion-picture film, video recording,
electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in
which a living animal is intentionally maimed,
mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such
conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of
the State in which the creation, sale, or possession
takes place, regardless of whether the maiming,
mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place
in the State; and
(2) the term "State" means each of the several
States,
the
District
of
Columbia,
the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the
United States.!
Section 48 apparently worked-the statute's sponsors declared
the commercial crush video trade dead by 2007.8 Unfortunately for the
animals, however, after finding that the statute reached beyond
depictions of intentional animal cruelty, the Court held Section 48
unconstitutionally overbroad and struck it down. 9 How could the Court
7. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1582 n. 1 (majority opinion).
8. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (majority opinion).
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have reached such an awful result? How could the Court have reasonably
found that language providing that "any visual or auditory depiction . . .
in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured,
wounded, or killed . . . " could reach beyond depictions of intentional

infliction of animal cruelty?' 0 As we shall see, a better understanding of
semiotics (i.e., the philosophy of meaning and signs)- including the
roles of purpose and framing in statutory interpretation, and the various
ways living beings might be used as instruments of expression- should
have led to a more enlightened result in this case.
B. PrimalDecency (Snyder v. Phelps)
"God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11," "America is
Doomed," "Don't Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Fag
Troops," "Semper Fi Fags," "God Hates Fags," "Maryland Taliban,"
"Fags Doom Nations," "Not Blessed Just Cursed," "Thank God for Dead
Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "You're Going to Hell,"
and "God Hates You."' 2
The above placard phrases were among those held up by
picketers in conjunction with the funeral of a heterosexual American
soldier killed in the line of duty.' 3 The picketers associated themselves
with the funeral to garner added attention for their placards.14 Although a
jury thereafter found that the picketers had caused the dead soldier's
father intentional emotional distress, the Court in effect found that, under
the facts of the case, the picketers had a First Amendment right to use the

10. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1582 n.1. See infra Part III.C. for a discussion and
critical analysis of the Court's reasoning in Stevens v. United States.
11. See infra Part lIl.D. Congress quickly passed substitute legislation, the
Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, P.L. 111-294, H.R. 5566, which
President Obama signed into law on December 9, 2010. See Abigail Lauren Perdue,
When Bad Things Happen to Good Laws: The Rise, Fall, and Future of Section 48,
18 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 469, 535 (2011). However, the effectiveness and
constitutionality of the substitute act remain a matter of debate. See id. at 534-48;
Andrew A. Beerworth, United States v. Stevens: A Proposal For Criminalizing
Crush Videos Under Current Free Speech Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 901, 917-24
(2011).
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216-17 (2011).
12. Snyder v. Phelps, _ U.S. _
13. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1213-14 (majority opinion).
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funeral to gamer such added attention regardless of the grievous injury
inflicted upon the father." Again, how could the Court have reached
such an awful result? As we shall see, a better understanding of semiotics
(including, again, the various ways living beings might be used as
instruments of expression) should have led to a more enlightened result
.
.
16
in this case as well.
C. PrimalPrinciples
Proper handling of cases like the ones above requires, among
other things, a fundamental understanding of how meaning works, how
meaning is found, how living beings can be used as instruments of
expression, and how the rights of living beings must be recognized and
balanced when such beings are used as instruments of expression. At the
outset, this requires understanding and recognizing the following
principles:
1. Interpretation Involves Purpose and Frame as Well as Words
When interpreting a rule, regulation, statute, constitution, or
contract, one must, of course, understand how meaning works before one
can attempt to ascribe meaning to the matter at hand. As further
discussed below, meaning involves three interrelated levels: reference,
frame and disposition. The first or reference level of meaning is the focal
point of experience, thought, or emotion explored. For example, if I
have a particular sound that I wish to analyze, that unanalyzed sensation
is a reference. The second or framing level of meaning consists of the
possible judgments or determinations one may make about that
reference. 8 For example, I may concede that sound indicates either a fly
or a bee. The third or disposition level of meaning is a determination or

15. See id.
16. See infra Part IV. As we shall see, though Stevens and Phelps employ
different kinds of signs in their expression, they are analogous in forcing living
beings to participate in a type of expression that such living beings reject. See infra
Parts Ill, IV.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.A.
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resolution made about the reference as framed.' 9 Continuing with the
buzzing example, I might conclude that I am hearing a bee-one of the
only two possibilities as framed. Of course, other possibilities would
exist under other frames such as "the sound indicates a bee, fly, wasp, or
hornet." In the legal context, one must always be vigilant in
understanding the frame employed, and one should never simply concede
a result because the frame demands it when another reasonable frame
may generate a different result.20
The meaning of a rule, regulation, statute, constitution, or
contract is no less triply-complex than the meaning of "bee." Meaning in
this context also involves a reference (often a goal or problem
addressed), a frame (often the words of a rule, regulation, statute,
constitution or contract addressing the goal or problem), and a
disposition (often the determination or resolution of matters involving
the reference). For example, the reference of a statute criminalizing child
pornography can be the desired prohibition of child pornography, the
frame can be the words of the statute, and the disposition of a particular
case under the statute can be the handling of the case in light of the
desired prohibition and the words of the statute (or in other words, in
light of the reference and the frame). In both such cases, no meaning
exists without a reference and a frame, and frames are both fungible and
permissive of multiple resolutions (such as the conclusion that the buzz
indicates the presence of a bee or fly or, under a different frame, a wasp
or hornet).
Thus: (1) competent courts must consider the purposes and
goals of any rule, regulation, statute, constitution or contract under
interpretation; and (2) forthright courts must concede the importance
and flexibility of framing. As we shall see, straightforward
acknowledgement and understanding of these two points lead to a more
rational, honest, and humane analysis of the crush video case, U.S. v.
2
Stevens, 1 and with further semiotic insight, a better analysis of the
1 22 as well.
funeral protest case, Snyder v. Phelps

19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See

infra Part II.A.
ANTHONY

G.

infra Part 111.
infra Part IV.

AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW 173-76 (2000).
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2. Living Signifiers Have Rights
As discussed in more detail below, living beings can be used as
- 23.
instruments of expression. For example, in discourse, we might use our
mayor to signify our city. However, one might also try to use him in
more pernicious ways. A madman might wish to tar and feather him to
signify disgust with city management. Conceding, for the sake of
argument, that the madman has the right to express disgust with city
management, surely no reasonable person would hold that the rights of
the mayor would not also come into play in such a case of expression.24
Thus: (3) competent courts must consider and weigh the rights of living
beings when others would use such living beings as instruments of
expression (or "signifiers" as we shall define the term below) . This
obvious moral principle seemed to play little if any role in both the crush
video case of U.S. v. Stevens and the funeral protest case of Snyder v.
Phelps. Because this moral principle was not carefully considered in
these cases, the more fundamental question of when usage of living
26
creatures as signifiers occurs also was not addressed.
A basic

23. See infra Part II.A.
24. As Steven J. Heyman succinctly puts it, "[t]he First Amendment should not
be interpreted to protect speech that violates the rights of other people, except in
situations where the value of the speech outweighs the value of the other rights with
which it conflicts." Steven J. Heyman, To Drink the Cup ofFury: FuneralPicketing,
Public Discourse, and the FirstAmendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 101, 108 (2012). As
a matter of simple logic, such balancing must of course be allowed since no
considerations of harm to others could potentially "lead to the protection of every
terrorist act." Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 982 (1990). See infra note 90 for cases supporting the
conclusion that the First Amendment does not protect violence. See infra Parts IIE,
lll.D.2.c (discussing the need to balance interests).
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. Though the Court found no compelled participation in expression in
Stevens and Snyder, it has rejected attempts to compel speech in some cases. See
Alan Brownstein & David Amar, Death, Grief And Freedom of Speech: Does the
First Amendment Permit the Harassment and Commandeering of Funeral
Mourners?, 2010 CARDozO L. REV. DE Novo 368 (2010) (analogizing Snyder to
"compelled speech" cases and discussing, inter alia, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977) (which invalidated a Vermont statute requiring residents to display "Live
Free or Die" on their license plates), Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974) (which invalidated equal time requirements for newspapers), and Pac.
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understanding of the types of signifiers assists in this analysis; this
includes understanding how types of signifiers such as indices by
definition use living signifiers in ways that require considering the rights
27
of such living beings.
3. Speech Involves More Than Mere "Expression" or "Ideas"
As in Stevens and Snyder, when focusing on the permissibility of
message, idea, or content-based governmental restrictions, much First
Amendment analysis downplays or ignores the harm caused by the
regulated expression. 28 On the surface, this may seem required by some
(or all) of the reasons commonly given for protection of speech:
protecting democracy and our right to self-governance,29 permitting "the
search for knowledge and 'truth' in the marketplace of ideas," 30
protecting "individual autonomy, self-expression, or self-fulfillment,"3
and fostering tolerance.32 Without delving more deeply beneath the
surface, one may conclude that regulating the content of one's speech
endangers one's right to speak on matters of public concern, interferes
with the battle of truth in the marketplace of ideas, and circumscribes
one's autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment.
However, matters are not this simple. As discussed in more
detail below, speech and other expression involve more than message,
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (which invalidated
a requirement that utility companies include third party messages in their billings)).
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See Heyman, supra note 24, at 141-42 (lamenting a trend to this effect
over the last four decades); see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972) (holding that governments may not restrict expression based on message,
idea, subject matter or content).
29. See generally James Weinstein, ParticipatoryDemocracy as the Central
Value ofAmerican Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011) (arguing that a
theory of individual participation in the democratic process explains the First
Amendment's structure).
30. Id. at 502 (setting forth the rationale and arguing that "a completely
unregulated market of ideas will lead to discovery of truth is highly contestable").
31. Id. at 502-04; Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value,
33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 498-503 (1998) ("First Amendment analysis
[should] attend more self-consciously to the speaker's development through
expression.").
32. See Bollinger, supra note 24, at 984-85.
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13

idea, or content,
and good First Amendment analysis must
acknowledge this. Speech and other expression involve the use of signs,
and signs involve elements other than "content" or "meaning." 3 4
Failure to consider these other elements in some cases can have
horrific results. Considering the madman example again, 35 how would
allowing him to tar and feather the mayor protect autonomy? How would
permitting such tarring and feathering further self-governance, aid the
discovery of truth, or foster tolerance?
As discussed below, although courts have limited speech in
certain areas because of damage to others,36 they have not done so in
other cases such as Stevens and Phelps where living beings have suffered
grievous injury.37 This paper will explore one reason for such judicial
inconsistency: the judicial failure to address in a consistent manner the
relevance of injury to living beings (such as the mayor in the example
above) when such living beings are used as signifiers.38 In other words:
(4) analysis offreedom of expression must address, where appropriate,
all of the elements of signs and not just the "meaning" component of
33. See infra Part II. Apart from the semiotic concerns addressed in this article,
content neutrality analysis must address other questions. For example, if one relies
solely on the functional democracy rationale for First Amendment protections, why
would content restrictions on purely-private speech run afoul of the First
Amendment when there is no general impact on public discourse? A marketplace of
ideas approach also faces potential criticism. To the extent content neutrality
approaches ground themselves in democratic concerns, the purely-private speech
points apply. Furthermore, even in the purely public sphere, fraudulent speech, for
example, has no place in a marketplace seeking truth. Tracing and exploring in detail
the content-based restrictions permissible under the self-government, marketplace of
ideas, individual autonomy, self-expression, self-fulfillment, and tolerance rationales
for First Amendment protections is beyond the scope of this article.
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. 1 of course do not mean to suggest that current First Amendment doctrine
would allow this practice. I use the example simply to make the logical point. See
supra note 23, 24. See also infra note 90 for a discussion of the First Amendment's
non-protection of violence.
36. See, e.g., infra Part Ill.D.2.c.
37. See Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT.
REV. 81 (2012) (discussing, among other things, Stevens, Snyder, and the Court's
general failure to directly address "the issue of speech-created harm" and suggesting
that the Court may lack "the conceptual and doctrinal arsenal necessary for grappling
with speech-associated harm.").
38. See infra Part III.D.2.c.
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signs. This principle should temper any excess focus of First
Amendment jurisprudence on content neutrality at the expense of other
important values such as preventing actual harm to others.39
II. MEANING, SIGNS, SIGNALS, SIGNIFIERS, AND SEMIOTICS

A. Meaning, Signs and What They Signify
To lay the groundwork for a more detailed analysis of the
conceptual shortcomings in both Stevens and Snyder, the following
examples explore in more depth the three levels of meaning and the use
of signs to grasp and convey meaning.
Let us suppose that I erect a statue of John the Fencer to honor
the man. In so doing, I am not using that statue as an end in itself but to
indicate something beyond itself, i.e., my opinion about the man.
Expression in such a case therefore involves something (which I shall
call the signifier) which intentionally "stand[s] for something else" 40
(which I shall call the signified) to someone (the speaker or listener or
both).4 In that case, the signified would be a reference (the man) which I
have further refined in discourse with a frame (he is a fencer who is
either honorable or dishonorable) and which I have further refined with a
disposition (he is an honorable fencer). Such expression can thus be
diagrammed as follows:

39. See Heyman, supra note 24, at 141-42.

40. ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME 75 (2007). Thus, for
example, if a tree's bark grows in a way that creates a cross on its trunk, that cross is
not a sign unless someone uses or perceives that mark to convey religious or other
meaning. See also infra note 41. Intention's role here explains "[w]hy on a Sunday
morning, when you awaken at eight o'clock and hear your neighbor mowing his
lawn you are agitated and angry .

. .

. but if you hear thunder and lightning you will

return to your covers and sleep. Only those crazed like Ahab will feel the same
affront from nature as from a mind-but that is because they see an evil mind behind
nature." Bollinger, supra note 24, at 982.
41. See WINFRIEDNOTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 79-80 (1995) for a table of
various sign terminology, including Saussur'es "signifier" (signfiant) and "signified"

(signifi6).
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I shall use the term "sign" to refer to this intentional usage of a
42
signifier and a signified as diagrammed above. In such a case, again,
the words "John the Fencer" are the signifier and the man himself-as
understood by the speaker at least43-is the signified.
Where we have such a sign, the sign consists of both the signifier
(e.g., the words "John the Fencer") and the signified (John the Fencer the
man as understood by the speaker or listener or both) and should not be
confused with the signifier alone.4 In this article, I will only use "sign"
in the semiotic sense of both signifier and signified.
42. According to C.S. Peirce, a founder of pragmatism and one of the founders
of modem semiotics, a sign must be "something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity." CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED
PAPERS §2.228 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Belknap Press 1974). See
also JOSEPH BRENT, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: A LIFE, (1993); CHRISTOPHER
HOOKWAY, PEIRCE (1992). Furthermore, according to Peirce, "nothing is a sign
unless it is interpreted as a sign." CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS
§2.306 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Belknap Press 1974). According to
Benson, "[t]he something that [one] says has meaning-it may be words or larger
units of a text, or sounds, or objects, or feelings, or events in nature, anything that
stands for something else-will be called a sign." BENSON, supra note 40, at 78
(emphasis added). Benson understands meaning itself for a given person on a given
occasion to be that person's "experience of [a] series of signs, ending in some mental
or behavioral event." Id. at 25. The philosopher John R. Searle succinctly describes
such necessary "intentionality" as "that property of many mental states and events by
which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world."
JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY I (Cambridge 1983).
43. The "man himself' is not a Kantian "thing-in-itself" but a focal point of
experience, thought or emotion which is framed for possible categorization and
perhaps "dispositively" categorized in the manner discussed in this Section.
44. NOTH, supra note 41, at 79-80. Confusing these terms is of course easy to
do since we also use "sign" in ordinary speech to mean just the signifier itself. One
might say, for example, "turn left at the stop sign down the road," or "I don't have
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Consider a slight modification of our hypothetical: If everyone
agrees that we see John the Fencer, we are referring to a portion of
common experience (the reference) that we have framed as a fencer and
determined to be John the Fencer. Conversely, we can have other cases
where there is actual or potential disagreement at any of these three
levels. For example, if I alone speak of my good title to Blackacre, I am
referring to a portion (the reference) of experience that I have framed and
purportedly determined. I say "purportedly determined" because others
may dispute both the frame and the disposition. In the case of my claim
about Blackacre, for example, a communist might dispute the private
ownership frame that makes such a claim possible while others may
concede the frame but deny my good title. One might therefore diagram
the relationship between signifier and signified (i.e., reference, frame,
and disposition) as follows:

any political signs in my yard." In such usage, "sign" means the physical object used
to express traffic rules or political views.
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SIGNIFIER

-

Something-anythingwhich stands for something
else to a person/mind.
For example, a statue of John
the Fencer.

P
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SIGNIFIED

The meaning of the signifier, as
interpreted by a person/mind.

1. REFERENCE
*A focal point of experience.
eFor example, certain visual and
auditory experiences to be
categorized.

2.FRAME

eThe possible judgments or
determinations one may
make about the reference.
*For example, "this is the sight

and sound of a fencer."
3. DISPOSITION
*A determination -a

-which

resolution

one makes about

the thing as framed and
referenced.
*For example, "this is John the
Fencer."

Of course, what constitutes reference, frame, and disposition is
contextual. For example, "Alexander the Great is either guilty or not
guilty of war crimes in Egypt" is a sign because it has both a reference
(i.e., the actions he took in Egypt) and a frame of that reference (i.e., he
is either guilty or not guilty of war crimes). "Alexander the Great is
guilty of war crimes in Egypt" would include the above reference and
frame as well as a proposed disposition of the reference within that
frame. However, "Alexander the Great is guilty of war crimes in Egypt"
would be the reference or focal point where one is debating the meaning
of that specific phrase.
Hence, on the face of things, one can intend that anything stands
for anything else. Although it may seem silly, there is no reason why, for
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example, one cannot intend that a tree stand for the moon. However, the
Court has sometimes appeared to deny this basic truth. In United States
v. O'Brien,45 the Court rejected "the view that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."46 This seems to me,
however, to be a confusion of terminology by the Court. Distinguishing
between signifier and signified, I believe that the Court actually meant to
say that the First Amendment does not protect the usage of every
logically-possible signifier in expression in O'Brien, burning a Selective
Service registration card. This would be consistent with the Court's
distinction in the case between "speech" and "nonspeech" elements
If I am correct, a more
"combined in the same course of conduct.
precise distinction in this latter statement would be between the signified
and signifier used "in the same course of conduct." 4 8 As we shall see
below, limitations on usage of certain signifiers (such as living beings
used as signifiers against their will) are indeed appropriate.49
B. ContrastingSigns and Signals
Some would also distinguish signals from signs; unlike signs,
signals (if they exist) simply provoke instant, unreasoned action.50 Like
signs, such signals would have signifiers; unlike signs, they would lack
references and frames and thus dispositions (i.e., handlings of the focus
in the context of the frame). 5 1 For example, some might contend that the
trembling of the earth can provoke an instant, unreasoned run for cover,
or a falling box can provoke an instant, unreasoned dash to catch it. If
45. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
46. Id. at 376 (upholding a statute preventing the burning of Selective Service
registration cards).
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. See infra Parts IIF, IIl.D.2.c & IV.B.3.
50. See Noth's discussion of various uses of the term "signal" including the
view that "signals have only a sensory-motor function." NOTH, supra note 41, at
112. See also BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 18 (1997) ("A
signal can be a stimulus that does not mean anything but causes or elicits
something.").
51. See NOTH, supra note 41, at 107-13, for a discussion of the ways others
have used the term "signal."
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they exist, signals would thus, by definition, be expressionless because
they would refer to nothing. Instead, again, signals would consist of
52
signifiers plus such mere unreasoned action.
Assuming that such signals do exist, 3 would, for example, the
shouting of "boo!" that provokes an instant, unreasoned fear in the
addressee be a signal and not expression? Would the adult magazine or
crush video that provokes instant, unreasoned arousal in the viewer be a
signal and not expression?
One might initially respond that fear and arousal are emotions,
not thoughts, and are thus not expression. This analysis would, however,
underplay our emotional engagement with the world. The Court itself has
noted that "words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force."54 This emotional engagement with the world has been
persuasively studied and described,55 and the notion that fear or arousal,
for example, have no expressive nature is simply incorrect. 56 Signal
theory can therefore supply no easy First Amendment solutions for crush
video bans even if such videos merely provoke some form of emotion
such as arousal. This Article shall explore this and related points in more
detail in Part III.D. 1.

52. 1 personally doubt that such signals exist. I believe that any signifier
"provoking" an "instant, unreasoned action" would need to do so within the context
of a conceptual or emotional framework that turns the "signal" into a sign. I believe
that we jump out of the way of a falling box because we have concepts of "box" and
"injury" and further believe that we would not jump in the absence of such concepts.
53. Again, I personally doubt that such signals exist. See See infra Parts II.F,
III.D.2.c & IV.B.3.
54. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
55. See generally ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: EMOTIONS AND THE
MEANING OF LIFE (Hacket Publ'g Co. 1993) (particularly Chapter 8: The Emotional
Register, pages 223-308). See also JACKSON, supra note 50, at 24 (discussing views
that law "is a collection of symbols capable of evoking ideas and emotions, together
with the ideas and emotions so evoked."). Searle also recognized the expressive
nature of emotions. SEARLE, supra note 42, at 2 ("Undirected anxiety, depression,
and elation are not Intentional, the directed cases are Intentional."). Searle in fact set
out an expansive list of "Intentional states" which includes many emotional ones. Id
at 34.
56. See supra note 50.
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C. Signifier Types and CorrespondingSigns
Returning to signs, we often think of signifiers as verbal (such as
the words "George Washington" signifying the man himself). However,
signifiers need not be verbal. A frown, for example, may signify
disapproval as well as (if not better than) the phrase "I disapprove." An
act or thing, therefore, may serve as a signifier. And any useful basic
typology of signifiers will turn on criteria other than merely verbal ones.
PEIRCE'S THREE TYPES OF SIGNIFIERS
ICONS

-

a

thing

(signifier)

that

resembles what it signifies.
*A sculpture of John the fencer
resembles John the Fencer, the
man.

eL

SYMBOLS - A thing (signifier) that

bears a relation to what it signifies ONLY
because of some arbitrary designation.
*"George the Gripper" could elicit
thoughts of the same man if John
had been named George and if
fencing were known as gripping.
Indexes - a thing (signifier) that signifies
by participating with what it signifies.
*A weathervane fashioned in the
shape of John the Fencer
indicates wind direction by
participating in the wind flow.

"John the Fencer"

In this regard, C. S. Peirce57 gives us a useful tripartite typology:
(1) signifiers that signify by resembling what they signify (iconic
signifiers such as a bust of John the Fencer); (2) signifiers that signify by
convention or other arbitrary designation (symbolic signifiers such as the
words "John the Fencer"); and (3) signifiers that participate in what they

57. A founder of pragmatism and pioneer in semiotics. See, e.g., BRENT, supra
note 42; HOOKWAY, supra note 42.
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signify (indexical signifiers such as weathervane that indicates the
58
direction of the wind). As we shall see, the nature of the indexical
signifier sheds particular light on the Court's error in Stevens. 59 Taking
each in turn, an icon uses an iconic signifier (i.e., a signifier that
resembles the signified) to signify a reference, a frame, and possibly a
disposition. For example, a painting of George Washington crossing the
Delaware River60 could be used by its owner as an icon, which refers to
an historical experience, which frames that experience as a river crossing
and which has a disposition of a brave river crossing. The painting's
owner could also use the painting in non-iconic, and thus expressionless,
ways. For example, the painting's owner could simply hang it to cover a
hole in a wall.
A symbol typically uses a conventional or other arbitrary
signifier to signify a reference, a frame, and possibly a disposition. For
example, one may feel warm, weak, and uncomfortable (the reference).
One may frame that experience as a disease and conclude that one has a
cold (the disposition). In that case, one's statement that "I have a cold"
would be symbolic expression since "I have a cold" gets its meaning
purely by the conventional usage of such terms.61

58. See PEIRCE, supra note 42, at §§ 1-369, 1-372. Strictly speaking, iconic and
indexical signifiers are in the final analysis actually conventional. What constitutes
resemblance and participation is a matter of categorization. Since categories
(including those of similarity and participation) can vary from time to time and place
to place as convention demands or permits, iconic and indexical signifiers must
therefore be conventional as well. One might therefore more precisely distinguish
between three kinds of conventional signifiers: the iconic, indexical and symbolic.
However, from a lawyer's perspective, this seems perhaps a needless complexity and
I have chosen to follow an approach that follows the more "common sense" belief
that resemblance and participation are something more than simply convention.
59. See infra Part Ill.D.2.b.

60. Cf Emanuel Leutze, Washington Crossing the Delaware, (1851), available
at www.ushistory.org/washingtoncrossing/images/washingtoncrossingjpg.
61. If one simply utters those words alone in a random and unconscious state,
they would of course not be symbolic expression by the utterer since no meaning
was intended or perceived. Others, however, may find meaning in such utterances. I
explore the distinction between intended and perceived expression below in Part
II.D. Ideally, the intended and perceived expressions have identical meaning, and
clarity could be defined as the convergence of both forms of expression in a given
case.
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Symbols need not only use words as signifiers. They can employ
anything intended or perceived to operate as a signifier. For example, the
American flag is an obvious symbol of America, and burning that flag
can be a symbol for dislike of America or American policy. Despite
Chief Justice Rehnquist's claim that "flag burning is the equivalent of an
inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be
indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others,"
the flag can thus be part of quite meaningful symbolic expression.63
However, just as words without intended or perceived meaning are not a
sign, burning a flag can also be non-symbolic. For example, burning a
flag can be a proper means of flag disposal and need express nothing in

such a case.64
An index uses a signifier that signifies by participating in a
reference, a frame, and possibly a disposition. For example, a
homeowner concerned about the wind (the reference) can frame the wind
as something which has direction and can mount a weathervane to
61
indicate that direction.
Such indications, which come from the
weathervane's interactions with the wind, would therefore serve as
66
dispositions of the references framed.
In reviewing indexical expression, one should note at the outset
that indexical signifiers raise problems not always found with iconic and
symbolic signifiers. Since indexical signifiers participate with what they
signify, they cannot be analyzed on any purely-speech basis which
ignores any living signifiers in the indexical relationship. An air quality

62. For example, Gregory Lee Johnson protested the Reagan administration's
policies by setting an American flag on fire. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399
(1989).
63. Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

64. 4 U.S.C. § 8(k) (2006); See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 (1989) (stating that
"federal law designates burning as the preferred means of disposing of a flag" that is
no longer fit for display).
65. See PEIRCE, supra note 42, at §2.86 (A weathercock is an index of the
direction of the wind . . . [because] it really takes the self-same direction as the wind
66. As in the case of icons and symbols, the weathervane is also not a sign if
no intended or perceived expression exists. For example, if the homeowner mounts
the weathervane simply to cover a hole in the roof, the weathervane would not then
serve as an index for the homeowner. Of course, he could later discover a dual
purpose in the weathervane and then use it as an index as well.
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measurer,67 for example, would engage in indexical expression if he
measures air quality throughout the day by how well a person tethered to
a stake fares breathing such air. Of course, this would present more than
just First Amendment issues. As we shall see in more detail below, this
inherent difference between indexical and other forms of expression
provides strong support for Justice Alito's dissent in Stevens.
D. Intended and PerceivedExpression

How do you like
my drawing of a
box?

What
box?
I
thought you had
drawn a "Y."

Whether expression is symbolic, indexical, or iconic, expression
can be intended and perceived in different manners.69 For example, the
owner of the George Washington painting might wish to display it
proudly as a sign of deep regard for George Washington. Or he may hang
the painting to merely plug a hole-not intending for the painting to
signify anything. However, regardless of the owner's intentions, guests
in the owner's home may perceive the painting in ways intended or never
intended by the owner. For example, some may see the painting as
merely an expression of an old man. Some may see it as an expression of
a slave-owning hypocrite. In any case, the painting can have peculiar
meaning for these persons even when the owner hangs it with a different
intent or with no expressive purpose at all. As the Court put it in Spence
v. Washington,0 "[a] person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into

67. Cf Air Quality Information, Environmental Assistance and Protecion:
Forsyth County, North Carolina, www.co.forsyth.nc.us/eap/air qualityinfo.aspx
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
68. See infra Part 1I.D.2.b.
69. As the Court has recognized, it is "often true that one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
70. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
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it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and
Scorn." 7 1
Thorough analysis of freedom of expression, therefore, must
recognize a distinction between intended expression72 and perceived
expression. 7 3 Of course, for all practical purposes, the two modes of
expression often do coincide.74 However, when they diverge, the
divergence can be much more subtle and complex than the examples
discussed above.
For example, Robert Benson tells us how modem readers read
The Wizard of Oz quite differently from how the author originally
intended it to be read.75 Rather than a coming-of-age fairy tale of good
76
and evil, the author wrote the book as a Populist allegory. Here are just
a few examples of the author's originally-intended allegories: Dorothy as
the average person; the Yellow Brick Road as the gold standard;
Dorothy's silver (not red as in the film) slippers as free silver money; Oz
as an abbreviation of "ounce" (the measure of gold and silver); the
Wicked Witch of the East as "capitalists and bankers"; the Tin Man as
the factory worker; the Scarecrow as the farmer; the Munchkins as "the
little people' 77 ; the Cowardly Lion as William Jennings Bryan; and the
Wizard as the President who governs by sleight of hand. The author of
the Wizard of Oz's original intended meaning are lost on the modem
reader.79

71. Id. at 413 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632
(1943)).
72. Le., the creator's or owner's expression of the potential sign.
73. Le., anyone else's perceived expression.
74. I am not naively claiming that all persons have exactly the same take on
any piece of expression. There will always be some degree of divergence between
intended and perceived expression because no one person ever shares the exact same
perspective as anyone else. However, as we see every day, for purposes of action
and exchange, speaker and listener can for all practical purposes talk about the same
thing.
75. BENSON, supra note 40, at 52-53.
76. Id. at 52.
77. Presumably meaning the common people.
78. BENSON, supra note 40, at 52.
79. Id. at 52-53.

258

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

E. When Rights Diverge
In the case of The Wizard of Oz, the First Amendment protects
both the intended expression of the author and the perceived expression
of readers; the author has the right to express his allegory and the people
have the right to read and take their own message from the book. 0
However,what happens when rights in intended and perceived
expression conflict? Consider a hypothetical: John the Fencer owns a
rare marble bust of Thomas Jefferson and keeps a jester's hat on the bust
as an expression of his contempt for Jefferson. The State sees, at most,
humorous expression in John the Fencer's use of the bust, and the State
wishes to acquire the bust for hatless display in a museum. The State
offers both fair market value for the bust and an exact marble replica.
Under these facts, John the Fencer has a First Amendment right to use
the bust he owns to express his views about Jefferson. Assuming the
State has the constitutional right to take such property by eminent
domain for public use," it would have the right to take such a bust for
such museum use. How should we then balance the individual's and the
state's rights here? Is one more important than the other or is there a
possible solution in the distinction we have made between signifier and
signified? Should the degree of fungibility of the signifier (i.e., the bust)
proportionately reduce the strength of John the Fencer's claim? Should
we say that no real First Amendment question exists here since John the
Fencer can continue to make his point by simply putting the jester's hat
on the exact reproduction? As we shall see, these kinds of questions play
a critical role in any thorough analysis of both Stevens and Phelps.82
80. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("The right of freedom of
speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to
distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, [and]
freedom of thought . . . ." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Weaver v.
Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242 (1966) (en banc) ("Also encompassed are amusement
and entertainment as well as the exposition of ideas. . . . 'What is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine."' (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 510 (1948))).
81. See Warner/Elektra/Atl. Corp. v. Cnty. of DuPage, 991 F.2d 1280, 1285
(7th Cir. 1993) ("It is rare for American governments to requisition personal
property, but sometimes they do so and when they do they have to pay just
compensation." (citations omitted)).
82. See infra Parts III, IV.
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F. Several FurtherPrinciplesand Conclusions
For free speech purposes, several corollaries follow from the
discussion and questions raised above. First, of course, free speech or
expression issues cannot exist in the absence of signs. (5)3 At the
beginning of any thorough free speech analysis, one should, therefore,
first determine whether a sign exists and, if so, one should clarify its
typology (i.e., clarify the type of sign). If the typology of the sign is not
clearly understood, the manner in which the sign functions will not be
understood and this, of course, risks a flawed analysis.
(6) Where a sign exists, expression will have two to three levels
of meaning regardless of typology (i.e., a reference and frame and
possibly a disposition). These levels must be recognized and fully
protected to the extent required by law. As discussed above,84 any signs
will, at minimum, have reference and framing levels of meaning which
deal with the reference at hand and with the manner in which the
reference is framed. As further discussed above,85 more developed signs
will also have disposition levels of meaning.86 For example, if the First
Amendment protects my right to say "we should not have bailed out the
banks in the Great Recession," it is protecting my right to point out the
financial problem that occurred, to frame it as a matter subject either to
governmental action or inaction, and to handle the reference (i.e., the
financial problem) by advocating inaction.
(7) Signs have both intended and perceived meaning, and First
Amendment protection should therefore apply to both. At the same
time, addressing intended and perceived meaning can present difficulties
where the intended and perceived meanings differ, and the rights of the
speaker and audience to their meanings may therefore conflict.
Understanding the difference between signifier and signified, however,
might help resolve such conflicts if the conflict turns on the signifier and

83. I continue here the numbering of principles that were started in Part I.C.
84. See supra Part II.A.
85. See supra Part II.A.
86. Le., determinations of how to handle the focal points or references within
the context of the frames.
87. See supra Part II.D.
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the signifier is reasonably fungible (as in the Jefferson bust example
discussed above).
(8) On its face, no expression is unreasonably limited when we
prohibit intentional and unnecessary use of materially-harmful
signiffers when reasonably-equivalent, non-harmful signifiers exist.
For example, burning an exact copy of a draft card, rather than the
official card itself, conveys the same message to the unwitting viewer
without damaging an official document.8 Similarly, the First
Amendment should not protect physically knocking down another person
to indicate disgust for that person because of the risk of injury; 9 0
alternatively, pushing down an image of that person should convey the
same message of personal disgust without risking the possible harms. 91

88. See supra Part II.E.
89. Discussing this iconic alternative would have bolstered the Court's
decision upholding a draft card mutilation statute in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). Today, it would be easy to make an exact duplicate for burning; but
even at the time of the case, a folded piece of paper or one in an envelope, for
example, could perhaps have passed as the real thing before an audience.
90. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ("The
First Amendment does not protect violence."); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
, _, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1598-99 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The First
Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it most certainly does not protect
violent criminal conduct, even if engaged in for expressive purposes."); United
States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (N.D. Ohio 2012) ("The First
Amendment has never been construed to protect acts of violence against another
individual, regardless of the motivation or belief of the perpetrator.").
91. This is not to say that all signifiers are fungible. An obvious example of
lack of fungibility would be use of signifiers that uniquely convey emotional
meaning, such as the case of Mr. Cohen's "Fuck the Draft" jacket worn in the
corridors of the Los Angeles County Courthouse in 1968. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971). In that case, Mr. Cohen chose those specific words to express
publically "the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft." Id. at
16. In Mr. Cohen's case, no living being was forced to participate in or view his
expressive act-no bystanders were used in any fashion as signifiers and they "could
effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes." See id. at 21. To give a further more elevated example, Borges notes that
Dante's Beatrice "is not a sign of the wordfaith, she is the sign of the valiant virtue
and secret illuminations indicated by that word. A sign more precise, richer, and
more felicitous, than the monosyllabic faith." JORJE Luis BORGES, From Allegories
to Novels, in SELECTED NON-FICTIONS 346 (Eliot Weinberger, ed., Esther Allen,
trans., Penguin 2000).
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(9) Finally, and perhaps ironically, balancing rights of the
parties involved in expression may actually sometimes demand reduced
fungibility of signifiers. For example, the right to engage in a war protest
should not include the right to carry a real or apparently-realbomb on
the street as one's signifier when an obviously-fake bomb would convey
an anti-war message without the actual or perceived danger of a real or
seemingly-real bomb. 92
As we shall see, these principles shed much needed light on the
Stevens and Phelps cases discussed below.
III. UNITED STATES v. STEVENS AND THE LIMITS OF INDEXICAL
EXPRESSION

A. Section 48 and Dogfighting
[A]bused dogs used in fights endure physical
torture and emotional manipulation throughout
their lives to predispose them to violence; common
tactics include feeding the animals hot peppers and
gunpowder, prodding them with sticks, and
electrocution. Dogs are conditioned never to give
up a fight, even if they will be gravely hurt or
killed. As a result, dogfights inflict horrific injuries
on the participating animals, including lacerations,
ripped ears, puncture wounds and broken bones.
Losing dogs are routinely refused treatment, beaten
further as "punishment" for the loss, and executed
by drowning, hanging, or incineration.9 3

92. See infra Part III.D.2.b.
93. Stevens, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1602 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in Support of
Petitioner at 5-6, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No.
08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at *5). The Humane Society brief described other
dogfighting horrors such as:
An orchestrated fight to the death where tortured dogs and
puppies rip the skin and ears off their opponents, and bite
through each other's ears, paws, neck and genitals in a
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Dogfights are illegal in every state and in the District of
Columbia. 94 Like crush videos, some dogfight videos are shot for the sole
purpose of selling videos of such illegal activity.95 In addition to sales to
those who simply enjoy watching such cruelty, an illegal betting market
also exists which is facilitated by such videos.96 Persons who are afraid
to attend dogfights in person can still bet on them and then watch the
fights in their homes. 97 Such dogfight videos also encourage additional
illegal activity by serving as training materials for other dogfights.98
As with crush videos, the locations and criminals involved can
be hidden, making prosecution difficult, if not impossible. 99 As with
crush videos, the producers of such videos
can achieve anonymity by use
00
staff."t
clandestine
of a "bare-boned,
Therefore, Section 48's goals of addressing both the difficulties
of prosecuting videoed animal cruelty and the additional crime created
by such videos should apply to dogfight videos. 0 1 Additionally, Section
48 should apply to such videos by including in its definitions of
depictions of animal cruelty videos "in which a living animal is
intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such
conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the
creation, sale, or possession takes place . ...

desperate attempt to survive. To avoid impending death, one
dog rips out the trachea of the other, leaving the dead dog
sprawled on the ground covered in blood.
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in Support of
Petitioner at 5-6, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No.
08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at *2.
94. Stevens, 559 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1583 (majority opinion).
95. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1601 (Alito, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1602.

99. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
100. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1601 (citation omitted).
101. See id., 559 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
102. 18 U.S.C. §48(c)(1) (2006).
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B. Mr. Stevens' Videos and the Resulting Conviction and Appeals
Mr. Stevens operated "Dogs of Velvet and Steel" and a related
website.' 03 His enterprise sold videos of pit bulls dogfighting.104 He also
sold videos of dogs attacking other creatures, including wild boar, and
videos depicting a "'gruesome scene of a pit bull attacking a domestic
farm pig." 05
Because of these videos, Mr. Stevens was indicted under Section
48.106 Mr. Stevens moved to dismiss the charges by claiming that, under
the First Amendment, Section 48 is facially invalid.107 The District Court
denied the motion, the jury convicted Mr. Stevens under Section 48 as
indicted, and Mr. Stevens was thereafter sentenced to imprisonment for
thirty-seven months with three years of supervised release. 08 However,
on Mr. Stevens' appeal, the Third Circuit found Section 48 facially
unconstitutional and vacated his conviction.' 09
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2009110 and affirmed the
Third Circuit in 2010.'1 Justice Alito was the lone dissenter.112
C. The Road Taken by the Court
Two roads diverged in a wood, and 1I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
In Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
concluded that Section 48 was overbroad and, therefore, violated the

103. Stevens, 559 U.S. at _,

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

130 S. Ct. at 1583 (majority opinion).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

109. Id.; United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008).
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Stevens, 129 S. Ct. 1984
(2009) (No. 08-769).
111. Stevens, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
112. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
113. ROBERT FROST, COLLECTED POEMS PROSE AND PLAYS 103 (1995).
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First Amendment.l 14 As we shall see, the Court reached this conclusion
by taking odd turns at several forks in the roads of analysis. These were
turns that the Court need not have taken, and led the Court to reach an
unfortunate and avoidable result. For those who would see application of
the law as merely mechanical, the Court's opinion in Stevens should
demonstrate the error of their ways.
The Court acknowledged that a typical facial attack on Section
48 would place the burden of proof on Mr. Stevens to demonstrate that
the statute could be valid under "no set of circumstances.""' In light of
the crush videos the statute was meant to prevent, this would likely have
been an impossible burden for Mr. Stevens to overcome.116 Instead, the
Court turned to "a second type of facial challenge" that can invalidate a
statute as overbroad if "a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 17
In applying this "second type" of facial challenge, the Court
found Section 48 to have "alarming breadth."118 The Court was
particularly concerned that Section 48(c)(1)'s definition of depictions of
animal cruelty includes depictions where "a living animal is intentionally
maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed."ll 9 As the Court put it,
"'[m]aimed, mutilated, [and] tortured' convey cruelty, but 'wounded' or
'killed' do not suggest any such limitation." 2 0
Here, the Court arrived at its first fork in the road. It could have
easily applied the canon of noscitur a sociis 121 to find that "wounded"
and "killed" required cruelty since the accompanying words
"intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured" all involve cruelty.122
114. Stevens, 559 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
115. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (citations omitted).
116. Id at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (leaving an open door on a narrower crush
video statute).
117. Id at
, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).
118. Id at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1588.
119. Id
120. Id
121. That words are judged by proximate words. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY ( 9 th ed. 2009).
122. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also S.D. Warren Co.
v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006) ("The canon, noscitur a sociis,
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However, the Court rejected this common sense path in favor of a
harsher one. As the Court explained the options at this first fork in the
road:
The Government contends that the terms
["wounded" and "killed" used in the phrase
"intentionally
maimed, mutilated,
tortured,
wounded, or killed" under the heading of
"depiction of animal cruelty"] should be read to
require the additional element of "accompanying
acts of cruelty" . . . . The Government bases this

argument on the definiendum, "depiction of animal
cruelty," . . . and on "the commonsense canon of

noscitura sociis" ..... As that canon recognizes, an
ambiguous term may be "given more precise
content by the neighboring words with which it is
associated" .

. .

. Likewise, an unclear definitional

phrase may take meaning from the term to be
defined ....
But the phrase "wounded . . . or killed" at issue
here contains little ambiguity . .. .Nothing about

that meaning requires cruelty ....
Ignoring the other fork in the road, the Court thus chose the
ironically crueler route that "wounded . . . or killed" has "little

ambiguity" and that these words should therefore be read "according to
their ordinary meaning" and "[n]othing about that meaning requires
cruelty.",24 Of course, as the Court itself noted above and as we further
discuss below, by virtue of the very placement of the words, the statute
can just as well be read to require cruelty where the Court finds it
lacking.125 However, having chosen to construe the words in the manner
it did, the Court could then review some of the parade of horribles that
followed. For example, under the Court's reading, even a video of the
"humane slaughter of a stolen cow" would be covered by Section 48
reminds us that 'a word is known by the company it keeps', and is invoked when a
string of statutory terms raises the implication that the 'words grouped in a list
should be given related meaning."' (citations omitted)).
123. Stevens, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. See infra Part 11I.D.
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because no cruelty need be involved.126 The Court further discussed the
popularity of hunting, how state laws vary on how one may hunt, and
how Section 48 would therefore potentially create massive confusion
across state lines.127 As a result, the Court found that, as demand for
"hunting depictions" exceeds "by several orders of magnitude" demand
for crush or dogfighting depictions, much more legitimate expression
than illegitimate expression would be prohibited under Section 48.128
Next, the Court arrived at a second fork in the road. Section
48(b) provides that Section 48(a) does not apply to "any depiction that
has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value." 29 The Court found most hunting videos lack
obvious instructional value, apparently believing that many have no more
than "recreational" value.130 Of course, "recreational value" is not one of
the categories in Section 48(b) and owners of hunting videos that depict
wounding or killing of animals would therefore be criminals under
Section 48. However, as we shall see below,132 the Court could have
just as easily found that hunting videos indeed fell in one or more of the
categories of exceptions if they had the "serious" value required by

Section 48(b).1 33
On the question of "serious" value, the Court arrived at its third
fork in the road and once more chose an avoidable route. Again, Section
48(b) provides that Section 48(a) does not apply to "any depiction that
has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value."' 3 4 The Court apparently interpreted "serious"

126. Stevens, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. The cow must be stolen, of
course, because the underlying videoed conduct must be unlawful.
127. See id at _,

128. Id. at _,
129. Id. at _,
130. Id.
131. See id at _,

130 S. Ct. at 1589.

130 S. Ct. at 1589.
130 S. Ct. at 1590 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§48(b) (2006)).

130 S. Ct. at 1588.

132. See infra Part III.D.
133. 18 U.S.C. §48(b) (2006).
134. Stevens, 559 U.S. at
, 130 S. Ct at 1590 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
(2006)).

§ 48(b)
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to mean something like "significant and of great import." 35 As the Court
put it:

The Government's attempt to narrow the statutory
ban [of Section 48 by reading "serious" to mean,
for example,

"not scant"]

. . . requires

an

unrealistically broad reading of the exceptions
clause [containing the term "serious"]. As the
Government reads the clause, any material with
"redeeming societal value," . . . "at least some
minimal value," . . . or anything more than "scant
social value," . . . is excluded under [the exceptions

clause of] § 48(b). But the text says "serious"
value, and "serious" should be taken seriously. We
decline . . . to regard as "serious" anything that is

not "scant." (Or, as the dissent puts it, "trifling" . . .
136

The Court's conclusion here, however, is of course not required
by common language usage. As Justice Alito pointed out, "serious" can
also mean "not trifling." 37 However, the Court chose not to follow
Justice Alito's route and analyzed Section 48 accordingly. Choosing
instead to take the route that Section 48(b)'s exceptions applied only to
matters which are "significant and of great import," 3 8 the Court of
course had little difficulty finding grave problems with Section 48.139
Since most of what we do, read, or view is not "of great import," the
Court thus chose a route that eviscerated much of Section 48(b).14
Having found Section 48 to apply to woundings and killings
lacking cruelty,141 and having found "serious" to mean something like
"significant and of great import," 4 2 it is hard to see how most (if any)
135. Id. The Court obtained this language from the District Court's jury
instructions which the government defended as "a commonly accepted meaning of
the word 'serious."' Id.
136. Id. at

137. Id. at

,

130 S. Ct. at 1590 (citations omitted).

n.4, 130 S. Ct. at 1595 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting). See also

AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1245 (3d ed. 1993).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Stevens, 559 U.S. at
,130 S. Ct.
Id. at
Id. at _, 130 S. Ct.
Id at _, 130 S.Ct.
Id at
, 130 S.Ct.

_, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
at 1590-92.
at 1590.
at 1588.
at 1590.
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hunting videos would fit under any 48(b) exception. 14 3 Since the market
for hunting videos is much greater than the market for crush videos, the
Court then had little difficulty finding the statute overbroad.144
In addition to the language of Section 48 itself, Chief Justice
Roberts also expressed external concerns about damaging the work ethic
of Congress. As he put it, a different interpretation of Section 48 would
"sharply diminish" the incentive of Congress to pass a well-worded
statute.145
Of course, the paths taken by the Court here were alternative
ones that the Court could have rejected at each of the three forks
discussed above.146 In fact, not only could the Court have taken different
routes, it should have taken different routes. In Section D, we shall
explore the basic principles the Court violated in taking its turns at the
three forks. We shall then further explore how semiotics helps to explain
how the Court unfortunately harmed free expression analysis, harmed the
poor animals involved, and harmed the public who must suffer the
additional criminal activity the animal cruelty videos generate. 14 7
In fact, this reasoning about the language of Section 48 and the
work ethic of Congress seems strangely at odds with other statutory
interpretation principles elucidated by Chief Justice Roberts. As Chief
Justice Roberts wrote in 2012 when upholding the Affordable Care
Actl48 by finding that its "penalty" meant "tax":
The text of a statute can sometimes have more than
one possible meaning. To take a familiar example,
a law that reads "no vehicles in the park" might, or
might not, ban bicycles in the park. And it is well
established that if a statute has two possible
meanings, one of which violates the Constitution,

143. 18 U.S.C. §48(b) (2006).
,
144. Stevens, 559 U.S. at
145. Id. at

_,

, 130 S. Ct. at 1589, 1592.

130 S. Ct. at 1592.

146. The Court somewhat imperiously stated, "Our construction of § 48
decides the constitutional question." Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. One would wish
for a more respectful view of separation of powers that seeks to understand and
implement the statute's clear purpose of addressing videos of true animal cruelty.
147. See id. at _,
130 S. Ct. at 1601-02 (Alito, J., dissenting).
148. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered volumes and sections of U.S.C.).
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courts should adopt the meaning that does not do
so ....

The question is not whether that is the most natural
interpretation . . . but only whether it is a "fairly

possible" one. As we have explained, "every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality."1 4 9
The Chief Justice further chastised the dissent in the Affordable
Care Act case for in effect contending that "the law must be struck down
because Congress used the wrong labels.",o
In light of Chief Justice Roberts' views in the Affordable Care
Act, how does one account for Chief Justice Roberts' apparent failure to
practice in Stevens what he preached in 2012? Perhaps the words from
2012 mark an evolution in Chief Justice Roberts' thinking. If so, perhaps
he would now agree with the alternative analysis that follows, an analysis
driven by a better understanding of semiotics that should have led to a
more enlightened outcome in Stevens.
D. The Road Not Taken

1. Signals or Signs Along the Road?
Before addressing the semiotics of statutory construction in this
case, a proper analysis should first determine whether animal cruelty
videos could be construed as signals or signs. For if they function as
signals, they express nothing and are thus subject to no First Amendment
protection.
One might argue, for example, that crush videos bought solely
for arousal express nothing. Rather, one might argue that crush videos
merely provoke instant, unreasoned acts of arousal. Either way, since
crush videos only foster an incoherent, emotional response, they would

149. Nat'] Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.

,

,

132 S. Ct.

2566, 2593-94 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
150. Id. at _,
132 S. Ct. at 2597 (discussing the terms "tax" and "penalty").
151. See supra Part llB, and the discussion of the unlikely existence of such
signals.
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signify nothing because they would have no reference, frame, or
disposition-and would thus express nothing. Since crush videos express
nothing, they would have no First Amendment protection, making
subsequent analysis irrelevant.
This argument, however, has fatal problems. First, even if true
signals could exist, even if the producers of crush videos intended them
to be merely signals, and even if they were always perceived only as
something arousing, arousal is more than mere physical reaction. As we
have seen, emotions involve their own forms of expression and
interaction with the world,152 and even under this scenario crush videos
would be more than mere signals. Second, the fact that Congress and
animal rights activists wished to ban crush videos because of the animal
cruelty involved shows that they at least perceived the videos as
depictions of animal cruelty and thus as more than mere signals. One
would also imagine that an ordinary person accidentally buying and
watching such a video would also see expressions of animal cruelty.
Perceived expression is no less expression than intended expression,15
and crush videos, therefore, involve more than mere expressionless
signals. As such, no simple First Amendment solutions exist along these
lines.
2. The Semiotics of Statutory Construction

a. The Vacuum ofPlain Meaning

As the review of the nature of signs indicated in Section II.A.
above, statutory expression involves three levels of meaning: reference
meaning, frame meaning, and disposition meaning.154 A thorough
analysis of any statutory expression should review all three levels of
meaning. As these levels of meaning are all interrelated, it of course
makes no sense to review one level of meaning apart from the other

152. See supra Part II.B.
153. See supra Part I.D.

154. See Harold Anthony Lloyd, "Original" Means Old, "Original" Means
New: An OriginalLook at What "Originalists"Do, 67 NAT'L LAW. GUILD REV. 135
(2010) (discussing the need to review all three levels of meaning in construction).
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two. 155 In other words, we must do more than merely parse the words of
Section 48 to find its meaning. A proper review of Section 48 must
include an intertwined review of the purpose of the statute (in this
context the reference level of meaning), the language of the statute (in
this context the frame of that reference), and the handling of the
reference or parts thereofl56 in ways permitted by the frame (in this
context the disposition level of meaning).157
As to the purpose of the statute, there can be little doubt that the
statute seeks to prohibit depictions of live animal cruelty except in the
cases enumerated in Section 48(b). As the Court itself recognizes,
Section 48 is titled "[d]epiction of animal cruelty."' 58 From the title
alone, there is little room for doubt that the purpose of the statute is to
address depictions of animal cruelty. Thus, the Court stated at the outset
of its opinion that Congress enacted Section 48 "to criminalize the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal
cruelty."l59 As legislative history accords with this,160 it should be
indisputable at this point that Section 48 addresses cruelty and not, for
161
example, the humane slaughter of a cow.
Moving next to the frame level of meaning (i.e., the text of the
statute itself) in light of the statute's purposes, it is puzzling that the
Court took the three roads discussed above, all three of which should
have been roads "less travelled by" if courts are to engage in meaningful
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. In the case of statutory application, disposition of the reference as
permitted by the frame often includes disposition of parts rather than the whole of
the reference. For example, if the focus of the statute is upon all animal cruelty
videos, a case involving only crush videos can still involve a disposition of that
subset of animal cruelty videos.
157. As noted in Part IIA, meaning is contextual, and our analysis here
presupposes a prior question: "How does one determine the meaning of Section 48?"
In the context of that question, the language of the statute is the reference, the frame
recognizes the three levels of meaning, and the disposition provides that the statutory
language, viewed in light of the focus or purpose of the statute, determines the
statute's meaning.
158. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _
n. 1, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582 n.l
(2010) (majority opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48).
159. Id. at

_,

130 S. Ct. at 1582.

160. See id at _,
130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting) (providing Justice
Alito's overview of such legislative history).
161. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1588 (majority opinion).
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statutory interpretation.162 First, Section 48(c)(1)'s caption "depiction of
animal cruelty," leaves little if any reasonable doubt that the words
"wounded" or "killed" require the cruelty lacking in such things as the
163
humane slaughter of a stolen cow. The Court itself has conceded that
Section 48 is about depictions of cruelty.1M Second, since the words
"wounding" and "killing" cannot be viewed apart from the stated
purpose of the statute, it is clear that the Court erred in not applying
noscitur a sociisl65 to read the words as "cruel wounding" and "cruel
killing" or the like. The Court simply chose the wrong road at this first
fork. 167
The Court also chose the wrong road at its second fork when it
found no clear exception category in Section 48(b) for hunting videos.168
Remembering that meaning includes both intended and perceived
meaning,169 hunting videos can easily be intended or perceived to fall in
every exception category. Those who believe in gun and hunting rights
could see hunting videos as valuable political statements. Those who

162. FROST, supra note 113, at 103.
163. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at
,
n.4, 130 S. Ct. at 1588, 1588 n.4 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 48(c)(1)).
164. See id. at
, 130 S. Ct. at 1587-88.
165. See supra note 121.
166. Construction canons are often much maligned. See HUHN, THE FIVE
TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 22-25, 101-02 (2d ed. 2008). This example shows how
such attacks are misplaced. A canon of construction is properly used where it
reconciles issue and frame meaning. Canons should not be applied when they do not
reconcile such meanings. Had the purpose of Section 48 been to include depictions
of humane killings and woundings as well, then noscitur a sociis would be
inappropriate. It is thus specious to attack canons on the grounds that for each canon
there is an opposite canon. See id at 102.
167. Not only would members of Congress presumably want their statute to
achieve its purpose, they can also always revise the statute should the Court
improperly resolve an ambiguity. See id at 128. Requiring Congressional remedial
action is surely less draconian than striking down the entire statute and breathing life
back into the crush video market. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at
,_130 S. Ct. at 1598
(Alito, J., dissenting) ("Now, after the Third Circuit's decision [facially invalidating
the statute], crush videos are already back online" (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae
the Humane Society of the United States in Support of Petitioner at 2, United States
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at
*5)).
168. Stevens, 559 U.S. at
, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
169. See supra Part II.D.
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study hunting methods or enjoy hunting could see hunting videos as
having scientific and educational value.170 Those who report on hunting
or hunting videos could find them to have journalistic value. Those who
study filming methods could see artistic value in hunting videos. Those
who have religious objections to hunting might find films have religious
value in their ability to convert others to such a religious view. Finally,
since some hunting videos could be filmed to record the history of a
special hunt, hunting videos can also have historical value. 7 1 It is
therefore hard to imagine anyone interested in hunting videos not falling
into one or more of these categories in these or other ways.
In fact, if any drafting problems occur with the statute here, they
might seem to run in the opposite direction of swallowing up the statute.
Fortunately for the animals, however, the exceptions also include the
requirement of "value."l 72 Among the various definitions of "value" is
"merit."1 7 3 Given the ethical dimensions of the term "merit," 74
understanding "value" in such a way would make sense in a statute
passed to reduce animal cruelty. Thus, since moral justification would be
lacking under this reasonable interpretation of "value," mere animal
cruelty should not fall under any exception of Section 48(b).
Continuing on in its confused journey, the Court also chose the
wrong road at the third fork discussed above. Rejecting claims that
"serious" in Section 48(b) means "not trifling," the Court appeared to

170. Stevens, 559 U.S. at

, 130 S. Ct. at 1595 (Alito, J., dissenting) (adding

educational and scientific categories as well).
171. To play the dictionary game as well, "historical" can simply mean "based
on or concerned with events in history." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 644 (3d ed. 1993). To continue the game, Congress did not use the term
"historic" which implies importance in history. Id. Instead, they used "historical"
which "refers to whatever existed in the past, whether regarded as important or not."
Id
172. 18 U.S.C. § 48(b) (2006) (requiring items to have "serious religious,
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value" in order to
qualify for exception from the law).
173. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 853 (3d ed. 1993).
174. Among the various definitions of "merit" are "a quality deserving praise
or approval" and "virtue." Id. at 853. These definitions are inconsistent with mere
animal cruelty.
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settle on a meaning in the range of "significant and of great import."l 75
The Court even seemed to find humor in its choice of roads, stating: "the
text says 'serious' and 'serious' should be taken seriously." 7 6 Of course,
on its face this understanding of "serious" cannot be right in light of the
purpose of Section 48. Again, most of what we do is not "significant and
of great import."l77 This is equally true of the ordinary videos that we
often watch. It is also hard to imagine how many hunting videos would
be "significant and of great import." 78 This, however, does not bring the
statute down. It brings down the inappropriate definition of "serious"
chosen by the Court.
The other course not taken, the course of defining "serious" as
meaning "not trifling,"l 7 9 would allow Section 48(b)'s exceptions to be
both meaningful and constitutional. Since frame and reference levels of
meaning are intertwined, and since the purpose of a statute seeking to
reduce animal cruelty would not be served by an avoidable reading that
invalidates the statute, the Court's histrionic definition of "serious" is
simply not reasonable. Instead, Justice Alito's understanding of "serious"
as meaning "not trifling"' ' reasonably accords with the purposes of
Section 48 while allowing the statute to pass constitutional muster.
In analyzing these roads not taken, we can also see a further
principle of interpretation that flows from the intertwined nature of frame
and reference. Since the words and focuses of statutes are intertwined,
and since statutes frame their reference or focus, it is illogical to read
statutes in avoidable ways that bring statutes down. Such avoidable
readings run counter to the way focus, frame, and disposition should
work together rather than in opposition. Where legislation may be
construed in multiple ways, courts should therefore construe statutes to
be both constitutional and well drafted to the extent possible in light of

175. Stevens, 559 U.S. at _,
130 S. Ct. at 1590 (majority opinion). This is
apparently a "gotcha" definition arising from the District Court's jury instructions to
which the Government apparently consented. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
178. See id
179. Which is a perfectly acceptable definition of "serious." See AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1245 (3d ed. 1993).
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. Stevens, 559 U.S. at
, 130 S. Ct. at 1595 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the purpose and words of the statutes.182 In this case, the Court's
proclamation that it would not "rewrite" Section 48 to make it
constitutional therefore makes no sense. Instead, looking at all three
levels of the statute's meaning, the Court effectively "rewrote" Section
48 to make it unconstitutional.
A correct reading of Section 48 in light of its stated purpose
provides a conservative (and perhaps too conservative) statute that only
bans depictions of animal cruelty that lack even trifling religious,
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.
On this reading, it is hard to imagine how the relation of invalid
applications of Section 48 to valid applications of Section 48 could be
substantial and thus support a facial challenge that the statute is
overbroad. 184
b. The Unique Case of Indexicals
Were this not problematic enough for the Court, a good grasp of
semiotics also shows a further unique problem with videos of this type.
Because photography and videotaping involve the interaction of the
subject with the recording medium, they are straightforward examples of
.
.185
indexical expression.
Child pornography, crush videos, and cockfighting and
dogfighting videos are all members of the same subset of indexical
expression. All three involve: (1) Usage of the children, dogs, and other
animals as a part of the very creation of the indexicals; and (2) Material,
unjustified harm to those so used.
Such indexical expression thus involves more than issues of pure
expression. The Court in New York v. Ferber recognized this point in the
case of child pornography.
Reaffirming Ferber, the Court
182. Justice Alito was thus correct where he asserted, in this case at least, that
the Court has a duty to construe the statute "so as to avoid serious constitutional
concerns." Id. at _,
130 S. Ct. at 1597 (Alito, J., dissenting).. See also id. at _,
130 S. Ct. at 1595 ("When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged
as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional
problems. . . ." (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982))).
, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at
184. Id. at _,130 S. Ct. at 1587.
185. See supra Part I.C.
186. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
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subsequently stated in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition'87 that "[w]here
the images are themselves the product of child sexual abuse, Ferber
recognized that the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard
to any judgment about its content." 88
c. The Indexical Harm Exception
Understanding that the child pornography exception turns on the
indexical nature of such expression, a more precise statement of the
underlying principle in Ferber does not require children as subjects.
Instead, it turns upon the harm inflicted on more than just children. For
example, adult pornography involving the murder of adults ("snuff
videos") would also fall outside the First Amendment.189 Both a secret
voyeuristic video filmed and distributed without the subject's consent
and a secret sex video of a gay college student filmed and distributed
without his consent and leading to his suicide, should therefore also fall
outside the First Amendment.' 90
Precisely put, the indexical question in Stevens is whether the
scope of protected indexical signifiers should include animals as well as
187. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
188. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002).
189. Although there is doubt whether any of these "snuff' films actually exist,
(see Barbara Mikkelson, A Pinch of Snuff SNOPES.COM (Oct. 31, 2006),
http://www.snopes.com/horrors/madmen/snuff.asp), any such films would be outside
the scope of First Amendment protection since the Court has plainly stated that
"[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware

Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
190. See CONN. GEN.

STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-189aa-189b (West 2012)
(criminalizing both voyeurism and the dissemination of voyeuristic material as Class
D felonies). In March 2012, Dharun Ravi was convicted of fifteen crimes including
invasion of privacy and bias intimidation, and sentenced to thirty days in jail for
secretly videotaping and distributing intimate scenes of his gay roommate. Michael
Koenigs et al., Rutgers Trial: Dharun Ravi Sentenced to 30 Days in Jail,ABC NEWS
(May 21, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/rutgers-trial-dharun-ravi-sentenced-30days-jail/story?id=16394014; Verdict Sheet, State v. Ravi, No. 1100400596, 2011
WL 7562705 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2011). On at least two occasions, Ravi used
a webcam to spy on his male roommate during his roommate's private romantic
encounter with another male. See Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 6, 2012, at 39, availableat http://www.newyorker.com/reporting
/2012/02/06/120206fa factparker. On one occasion, Ravi used his Twitter account
to solicit others to view a feed of the webcam. See id
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humans (children and adults). It should. Animals also clearly feel pain,191
and unjustified pain on its face is undesirable.192 Good government, by
definition, seeks to minimize unjustified pain within its jurisdiction, 93
which means that the underlying rule of Ferber applies to more than
underage human beings alone.194
In fact, understanding how signs work also helps demonstrate the
potential speech neutrality of this more precise statement of the rule
underlying Ferber. Portrayals of both animal torture and child
pornography need not be indexical. The same kind of expression can be
conveyed iconically (i.e., by imitation) and symbolically (i.e., by
words).'9 5 Computer-generated videos of animal torture, dogfights, and
child pornography can express such things by fictional imitation and
resemblance without causing any pain to an animal or child. The Court
has, in fact, expressly upheld the right to produce non-obscene virtual
child pomography for this very reason.'96 Other iconic (i.e., resemblance)
191. That animals felt pain was recognized by many at least as early as the
Eighteenth Century. See KEITH THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WORLD 175-78
(Pantheon Books 1983). This was a welcome contrast to the earlier Seventeenth
Century views of at least some Cartesians. These Cartesians believed that animals
were mere automata and that "the cry of a beaten dog was no more evidence of the
brute's suffering than was the sound of an organ proof that the instrument felt pain
when struck. Animal howls and writhings were merely external reflexes,
unconnected with any inner sensation." Id. at 33.
192. Pain is "[a]n unpleasant sensation varying in severity, resulting from
injury, disease, or emotional disorder." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 999 (4th ed. 2007).
193. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (including "promote the general Welfare").
194. For a detailed analysis of the compelling governmental interest in
preventing animal cruelty, see Perdue, supra note 11, at 494-501.
195. The Court recognized the possibility of iconic substitution in the case of
child pornography, recognizing that "the value of using children in these works (as
opposed to simulated conduct or adult actors) was de minimus." United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S.

_,

_

, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458

U.S. 747, 756-57, 762 (1982)). Justice Alito further addressed the very point that
symbolic and iconic avenues remained open, stating that "the statute does not apply
to verbal descriptions or to simulations." Id. at _,
130 S. Ct. at 1600 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Animal torture, dogfights, and child pornography can be expressed
iconically and also symbolically through written depictions of fictional subjects that
suffer no injury at all.
196. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250-51 (2002) (finding
unconstitutional a statute which "prohibits speech that records no crime and creates
no victims by its production," noting that "[v]irtual child pornography is not
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substitutions for real animals could of course include usage of realistic
imitations of the animals along with the necessary fake blood and
imitation screams.
The fungibility of either the virtual or imitation approaches here
is heightened by the extremely-fungible nature of arousal expression
itself. For example, pornography requires images of certain attributes
that arouse the particular viewer, and this does not necessarily require
images of specific, and only those specific, persons with the desired
attributes. This point would apply even more in the case of crush videos
since the viewer knows nothing about the particular animal involved in
the video.
A more precise statement of the injury principle (or at least one
of the principles) involved in Ferber would therefore seem to be: The
First Amendment does not protect indexical expression (1) where the
speaker unjustifiably' usesl98 a livingl99 human or other animal as an
'intrinsically related' to the sexual abuse of children," and further noting that
"Ferber'sjudgment about child pornography was based upon how it was made, not
on what it communicated").
197. Justification in this context requires a discussion well beyond the limits of
this article. However, to give a couple of examples, justification under this first part
of the exception could include filming a murder to provide evidence to police and
studying a murder video as a part of forensics instruction. In an attempt to build a
more general justification formula, one might return to 1942 and build in part on a
previous formula of the Court and ask whether "any benefit that may be derived
from [the expression] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). As the breadth
of "order and morality" may cause concern, a better formulation of this principle
might be: "protection is denied only when the speech value is 'clearly outweighed'
by the harm the utterance causes." David Crump, Desecration: Is It Protected
Speech?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1021, 1023-24 (2011) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572). For a general discussion of the need to understand the relationship
between harm and the First Amendment, see Schauer, supra note 37. See also infra
Part IV.B.3.
198. Like meaning, use can be intentional (e.g., the maker of a crush video) or
perceived (e.g., the distributor or purchaser who uses or distributes a video as a crush
video). Furthermore, use of force should not be a necessary component of "use"
because non-human animals cannot consent and there are certain activities (such as
murder) to which human victims cannot consent. See, e.g., People v. Minor, 898
N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) ("[T]he law does not permit a person to
consent to his own murder. That consent does not transform an active killing of
another into a suicide."); People v. Gray, 224 Cal. App. 2d 76, 79-80 (1964) ("[l]t is
no defense to assert that the victim consented to an assault upon her by force likely
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indexical signifier, and (2) where the living human or other animal
suffers unjustified, material harm as a result of such use.
The "use" in the first element covers not only those who
originally filmed the indexical expressions, but also those who otherwise
use the film or other videos of the underlying action.200 The latter
category would include, for example, those who copy or distribute crush
videos as well as opportunists who also directly use the indexical
victims. Thus, if B videotapes an animal crushing that A is conducting
and is videotaping as well (with or without knowledge of B's activity),
the first element would apply to the videos of both A and B.
The phrasing of the second element narrows the sweep of the
exception. If the harm is not material or is justified, the exception should
not apply. For example, if one traps a bird briefly to photograph its
201
beauty and does not harm the bird, this expression should be protected.
If, however, the bird is materially harmed in making the video and there
is no acceptable justification for such harm, both the video and its
inseparable underlying act should be subject to state response since such

to produce great bodily harm."); see also W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Consent as
Defense to CriminalAssault and Battery, 58 A.L.R.3d 662, § 2[a] (1974) ("Although
the cases are replete with broad general statements that consent is a defense in a
prosecution for assault, most of these statements are drawn from cases involving
sexual assaults of one kind or another, and in the few cases which have involved an
actual battery, without sexual overtones, the courts have usually taken the view that
since the offense in question involved a breach of the public peace as well as an
invasion of the victim's physical security, the victim's consent would not be
recognized as a defense, at least where the battery is a severe one." (footnotes
omitted)). Where human consent is permissible, such consent can be considered
under justification as can the application of any force.
199. Using dead humans or other animals is beyond the scope of this article
and will not be addressed.
200. This wide net captures all who intentionally participate in the production,
distribution and "enjoyment" of such videos; the issue of justification is then
addressed separately.
201. This is not to say, of course, that briefly "trapping" a child for such
purpose would be harmless even if the child suffers no physical or mental injury. As
a potential tort of false imprisonment, such an action in itself could be a material
harm. See, e.g., Drabek v. Sabley, 142 N.W.2d 798 (Wis. 1966) (holding that
defendant's conduct was unreasonable as a matter of law where defendant put a boy
into his automobile, while only a few yards from the boy's home, and drove the boy
to a police station).
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harmful expression could, for example, be replaced by other harmless
indexical expression or by iconic or symbolic expression.
This is not to say, however, that justification would
automatically exist in the absence of easy or reasonable fungibility. First,
the very concept of reasonable fungibility must take into account the
202
harm caused to the living signifier. This must broaden the universe of
the acceptable since it might well be very reasonable to accept some
imperfect fungibility to avoid severe harm to the living signifier.203 This
necessarily involves a balancing of rights, and there is no reason the
speaker's right should always prevail regardless of the injury to the
living signifier. Second, even if no reasonable fungible alternative exists
on this analysis, justification must still weigh the rights of the speaker
against the rights of the living signifier not to suffer serious injury.204
Again, there is no reason why the speaker's right should always trump in
such a case, and courts should not hide behind the cover of "content
205
neutrality" to avoid doing theirjob.
Of course, the elements of harm, materiality, and justification in
the indexical exception formulated here can often be controversial and,
much like the concept of "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
206
207
Amendment,
can evolve over time. For example, the justification

202. See supra note 90 to the effect that the First Amendment does not protect
violence.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Or they should not, as Heyman puts it, "short-circuit this inquiry by
invoking the content neutrality doctrine." Heyman, supra note 24, at 142. Instead,
they "should engage in a careful consideration of the values on both sides." Id
206. See supra note 197 on the scope of the justification element. See also
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (noting that the words of the Eighth
Amendment are neither precise nor standard in scope. Thus, "[t]he Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."). Compare, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)
(holding that the imposition of the death penalty on persons sixteen or seventeen
years of age does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on
persons who were under the age of eighteen when they committed a crime).
207. For example, in the 1640s, those who wished to kill animals merely for
pleasure could cite the Bible and "man's charter of dominion over the creatures."
THOMAS, supra note 191, at 22. "Of bear-baiting and cock-fighting they could say:
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element addresses such concerns as the hunting videos with which the
Court in Stevens expressed such angst.208 As long as hunting is
permissible, the justification element will generally protect hunting
videos. If hunting itself or certain hunting practices become
impermissible, then the justification element will no longer protect
videos of such activities. This, however, would not prohibit expression
since iconic replacement videos can take their place as can symbolic
descriptions of the activities. The justification element would similarly
address such other issues, such as, for example, the greater latitude that
209
should apply to distribution of videotapes of public figures.
In any case, the indexical-harm exception formulated here is
fully consistent with United States v. O'Brien.2lo Addressing First
Amendment issues where "speech" and "nonspeech" elements were
combined "in the same course of conduct," the O'Brien Court held:
[A] sufficiently important interest in regulating the
nonspeech
element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms . . .. [A]

government regulation is sufficiently justified if it
is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial
governmental
interest;
if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. 2 11
The Court in Stevens did not question the power of the states to
212
regulate animal cruelty.
Additionally, the Court in Stevens did not
'Christianity gives us a placard to use these sports."' Id. The very passage of Section
48 shows how far common wisdom has moved from such earlier notions.
208. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.

,

130 S. Ct. 1577, 1590

_,

(2010).
209. As demonstrated in Part IV.B.3, infra, restrictions on using humans and
other live animals as signifiers does not typically create, among other things, public
forum, religious discrimination, freedom of association, or satire issues.
210. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
211. Id. at 376-77.
212. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.

(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).

,

,

130 S. Ct. 1577, 1595
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question the important governmental interests involved, including
reduction of crime generated by such cruelty. 2 13 Furthermore, prohibiting
usage of live animals in filming is not based upon expression; the
prohibition is based upon cruelty to the animals and the resulting
criminal activity generated.214 Finally, prohibiting animal cruelty by
prohibiting use of live animals is no broader than necessary to achieve
that goal.2 15 Thus, none of these O'Brien factors weighed in favor of
invalidating Section 48.216 Instead, O'Brien together with a basic
understanding of semiotics would uphold Section 48 through proper
statutory construction and recognition of the indexical harm exception
that the statute tacitly used.
IV. SNYDER v. PHELPSAND THE LIMITS OF SHANGHAIED
SYMBOLS

A. Humans and Other Animals as Symbolic Signifiers

In addition to serving as indexical signifiers, humans and
217
Such symbols can be
animals can also serve as symbolic signifiers.
as
conventional (such as using George Washington a symbol of America)
or non-conventional (such as using George Washington as a brand of
cherries).
Thus, a person might shoot a cow to express his disgust for milk.
Or another might kidnap and hold hostage a board of directors to express
his disapproval of capitalism. Much like indexical usage, the living
beings here also serve as signifiers in such expression. Given the harm to
living beings and the potential existence of other harmless signifiers for
such expression, the same rule that applied to harmful indexical
signifiers should also apply to humans and other animals used as
symbolic signifiers in a way that violates their rights as living beings.

213. See id. at _,
214. See id. at _,

130 S. Ct. at 1601.
130 S. Ct. at 1601-02.

215. See id. at

130 S. Ct. at 1602.

_,

216. See 391 U.S. at 376-77.

217. They can of course also serve as iconic signifiers. For example, a person
who looks like George Washington can be used to signify George Washington.
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In a manner similar to the indexical expression exception, one
can therefore formulate the following exception for symbolic signifier
use: The First Amendment does not protect symbolic expression (1)
218
where the speaker unjustifiably uses a living human or other animal as
a symbolic signifier, and (2) where the living human or other animal
suffers unjustified, material harm as a result of such use.
The above rule for live symbolic signifiers presents the same
issues as living indexical signifiers in the areas of defining harm,
materiality, and justification discussed above.219 However, what counts
as "use" of live symbolic signifiers is not always as straightforward as
what counts as use of live indexical signifiers. In the case of indexical
signifiers, use is required by the very nature of the signifiers and no gray
areas exist where, for example, one videotapes a dogfight. Again, the
dogfight itself is required for the very existence of the tape. Yet, in the
absence of such a necessary relationship in the case of symbolic
signifiers, what kind of relationship must exist between a speaker and
another living human to constitute improper usage of that human as a
symbolic signifer? Phelps helps us both understand this question and
sheds further light on the questions of harm, materiality and justification.
B. The Snyders as Symbolic Signifiers

1. Matthew Snyder's Funeral
Again, in Phelps, picketers associated themselves with a dead
heterosexual soldier's funeral to garner added attention for their
placards.22 Prior to their protest, they had issued a press release designed
to turn the funeral "into a tumultuous media event." 22 ' The press release

218. Again, force should not be a necessary component here because nonhuman animals cannot consent and there are certain activities (such as murder) to
which human victims cannot consent. See, e.g., People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d 440
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). Where human consent is permissible, such consent can fall
under the justification element. However, where force is used the exception should
apply all the more.

219. See supra Part Ill.D.2.b.
220. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.

221. Id. at _,

,

, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011).

131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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stated that the picketers were coming "to picket the funeral of Lance Cpl.
Matthew A. Snyder."222 The press release further stated that "God
Almighty killed Lance Cpl. Snyder. He died in shame, not honor-for a
fag nation cursed by God .... Now in Hell-sine die."223
On the day of Matthew Snyder's funeral, the picketers carried
placards expressing their belief that "God hates and punishes the United
States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America's
,,224
military.
For about one half hour before the funeral, they picketed on
public land 1,000 feet from the church holding the funeral service.225 The
picketers obeyed all police instructions.226 The funeral procession came
within 200 to 300 feet of the picketers and Matthew Snyder's father
could see the tops of their signs but not their content. 22 7
However, while watching a newscast later that evening Matthew
228
Snyder's father learned of the signs' content. This content included the
following: "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11," "America is
Doomed," "Don't Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Thank
God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "God
,229
Hates Fags," "God Hates You," and "You're Going to Hell." The signs
also included purely iconic expression such as a depiction of "two men
engaging in anal intercourse." 2 30
Claiming emotional distress, Matthew Snyder's father filed five
Maryland state law claims in federal district court, including claims for
intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
231
civil conspiracy.
Matthew Snyder's father explained at trial how the
222. Id at _,131 S. Ct. at 1225.
223. Id
224. Id. at

_,

131 S. Ct. at 1213.

_,

131 S. Ct. at 1213-14.

225. Id

226. Id
227. Id
228. Id. at

229. Id. at
, 131 S. Ct. at 1213. I do not of course claim that these placards
on their own have no First Amendment protection. Instead, I argue that problems
arise when the protestors use Mr. Snyder's father in the symbolic fashion discussed
in this article. See infra Part IV.B.2-3.
230. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). Again, I do not claim
that this placard on its own has no First Amendment protection. Instead, I argue that
problems arise when the protestors use Mr. Snyder's father in the symbolic fashion
discussed in this article. See infra Part IV.B.2-3.
231. Phelps, 562 U.S. at
, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (majority opinion).
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picketers' actions harmed him both mentally and physically, including
232
Among other things, he stated: "I look at
exacerbating his diabetes.
this as an assault on me. Somebody could have stabbed me in the arm or
in the back and the wound would have healed. But I don't think this will
,,233
Matthew Snyder's father subsequently prevailed on the
heal.'
intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
civil conspiracy claims and was awarded substantial compensatory and
.
234
punitive damages.
On First Amendment grounds, the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment because it found the picketers' statements "were on matters of
public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely
through hyperbolic rhetoric." 235
The Court granted certiorari and agreed with the Court of
Appeals that the picketers engaged in public, not private speech even
though they "spoke in connection with a funeral. 236 Finding such public
expression exercised on public land entitled to special First Amendment
protection, the Court agreed that the intentional infliction of emotional
237
harm judgment should be set aside. Rejecting the claim that Matthew
238
the Court
Snyder's father was a member of a captive audience,
similarly concluded that Snyder's father could not recover on the claim
for intrusion upon seclusion.239 Because the third claim of civil
conspiracy was based on these two torts, the Court concluded that
Snyder's father could not recover on that claim either.240 As in Stevens,
241
Justice Alito was the lone dissenter.

232. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. _,
(2011) (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2145497, at *6.
233. Id. at *8.
234. Phelps, 562 U.S. at

131 S. Ct. 1207

, 131 S. Ct. at 1214.

235. Id.
236. Id. at
237. Id. at

_,

, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.
131 S. Ct. at 1219.

238. See infra Part IV.B.2 for a further discussion of the captive audience

doctrine.
239. Phelps, 562 U.S. at

, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.

240. Id.
241. See id at _,
131 S. Ct. at 1212 (Alito, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Stevens,
, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582 (2010).
,
559 U.S.
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2. The Question of Use
For the two-part living symbolic signifier use exception
discussed above to apply in Phelps, there must first be use of a human
242
being as a symbolic signifier. There can be no reasonable denial that
this necessary element exists. As noted above, the picketers' press
release expressly stated that they were picketing Matthew Snyder's
funeral because "[h]e died in shame, not honor-for a fag nation cursed
by God." 2 43 The Court thus acknowledged that "[t]here is no doubt that
[the picketers] chose to stage [their] picketing at . . . Matthew Snyder's

funeral to increase publicity for [their] views."244 As the Court further put
it, the picketers "exploited the funeral 'as a platform to bring their
245
message to a broader audience."'
Although use of the deceased Matthew Snyder cannot meet any
living use element, use of his funeral surely can. A funeral is a gathering
of living people and it is just this gathering-especially Matthew
Snyder's family-that the picketers wished to use symbolically. The
picketers in fact posted a message online in which they specifically used
Matthew Snyder's parents in their message:
Albert and Julie RIPPED that body apart and
taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and
to commit adultery. They taught him how to
support the largest pedophile machine in the
history of the entire world, the Roman Catholic
monstrosity .

. .

. They also, in supporting satanic

Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idolater.
Then after all that they sent him to fight for the
United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in
lock step with his evil, wicked, and sinful manner
of life, putting him in the cross hairs of a God that

242. See supra Part III.D.2.c.
243. Phelps, 562 U.S. at _,
131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at

245. Id.

, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (majority opinion).
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is so mad He has smoke coming from his nostrils
and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that? 24 6
On these facts, therefore, did the picketers improperly use
Matthew Snyder's father as a living symbolic signifier? The only
247
reasonable answer is that they did.
The fact that the picketers were approximately 1,000 feet from
249
248
the funeral, the fact that they were on public land, the fact that they
210
obeyed the police, and the fact that Matthew Snyder's father could not
25
initially read the picket signs ' are all irrelevant to the question of
symbolic use. From any distance, one can use another as a symbol and
can do so even if that person never knows of such use, and even if such
use does not violate any police instructions. I can, for example, use the
Queen to symbolize propriety even though we are oceans apart. Such
usage on its face does not require that either of us be in any certain place.
Such usage can occur even if she never knows about it and can occur
regardless of whether it violates any police instructions. Similarly,
though in a much less tasteful fashion, the picketers used Snyder's father
to signify a part of their message.

246. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting).
247. With their words and placards as signifiers, they of course also used Mr.
Snyder and the other mourners as an unwilling private audience. See Heyman, supra
note 24, at 107 ("The real issue in cases like Snyder is whether there is a First
Amendment right to address speech of this sort to the mourners at a funeral and
thereby cause them profound emotional distress."); Schauer, supra note 37, at 10003; Clay Calvert, Too Narrow of a Holding? How-And Perhaps Why-Chief Justice
John Roberts Turned Snyder v. Phelps into an Easy Case, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 11l
(2012) (discussing how the Court narrowly framed the case to eliminate
considerations of the Snyders as a private audience). See generally Jeffrey Shulman,
Epic Considerations: The Speech That the Supreme Court Would Not Hear in
Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 CARDOzO L. REV. DE NoVO 35 (2011), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/622 (discussing internet postings by
Phelps members that the Court majority refused to consider in Snyder).
248. Calvert, supra note 247, at 118.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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Thus, the Court's discussion of the "captive audience
,,212
doctrine" misses the point. Conceding for the sake of argument that
Matthew Snyder's father was not a captive audience, he was of course a
captive speaker. He was forced to help the picketers convey their hateful
message about him and about his dead son,254 and forcing Mr. Snyder to
participate in such speech of course raises First Amendment issues of its
255
own.
.253

3. The Questions of Harm, Materiality, and Justification
Having answered the question of use in the affirmative, we must
next examine whether the picketers used Matthew Snyder's father in a
way that caused him unjustified, material harm. There can be no
reasonable doubt that the picketers caused Snyder's father material
256
harm. To recover on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
252. That Matthew Snyder's father did not have to view or hear the picketers'
actions. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
,
, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (majority
opinion).
253. Phelps, 562 U.S. at
, -, 131 S. Ct. at 1219-20 (majority opinion).
254. See id. at _,
131 S. Ct. at 1222-25 (Alito, J., dissenting).
255. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 573-74 (1995) (describing how freedom of speech involves the choice of
what to say and what not to say); see also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 151-52
(3d Cir. 2010) (A district attorney violated a woman's First Amendment right to be
free from compelled speech where the district attorney threatened charges against
the woman for sending sexually suggestive text messages unless she attended an
education program. The education program amounted to compelled speech because
there was no evidence that the woman possessed or distributed sexually suggestive
photographs of herself and the education program would require the woman to write
an essay explaining how her actions were wrong.).
256. On the issue of harmfully using others as signifiers, Justice Alito raises
the interesting hypothetical of the culpability of "a cold and calculated strategy to
slash a stranger as a means of attracting public attention." Phelps, 562 U.S. at _,
131 S. Ct. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer in his concurrence notes that
Justice Alito's dissent requires the Court "to ask whether our holding unreasonably
limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress-to the point where A
(in order to draw attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a verbal
assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing the most intimate details of B's
private life, while knowing that the revelation will cause B severe emotional harm.
Does our decision leave the State powerless to protect the individual against
invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even in the most horrendous of such
circumstances?" Id. at
, 131 S. Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice
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distress under applicable state law, Matthew Snyder's father had to prove
,,257
"that the conduct at issue caused harm that was truly severe.
In fact,
the injury must be "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected
to endure it." 25 8 Thus, the elements of this tort claim are difficult to meet,
and the jury's unchallenged factual finding of the severity of harm
259
therefore more than satisfied the material harm requirement.
Consistent with this, the Court pointed out that there would have
been no liability had the picketers instead held signs stating "God Bless
America" and "God Loves You." 26 0 This is true because Matthew
Snyder's father would not have been used as a signifier in a way that
harmed him. Unfortunately, the Court drew the wrong conclusion that
"[ilt was what [the picketers] said that exposed [them] to . . .
damage[]."261 It was not what they said but how they said it-using
Matthew Snyder's father as a signifier in a way that caused him harm.
Whether this case falls outside First Amendment protection
should therefore turn on the final issue of justification.262 Was the
infliction of such severe harm upon Matthew Snyder's father justified
under the facts of this case?
The answer, of course, is no. Just as the signifiers in the animal
crushing and dogfighting cases are fungible, Matthew Snyder's father
was not a necessary signifier for the message the picketers wished to
convey. As Justice Alito pointed out, there were effectively an infinite
number of other ways to convey the substance of their message.263

Breyer believed the Court's decision does not leave the State so powerless. Id. at
,131 S. Ct. at 1221-22.
257. Id. at _,
131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing FigueiredoTorres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 75 (1991)).
258. Id. (quoting Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616 (1977)).
259. As Justice Alito noted in his dissent, the picketers "abandoned any effort"
to show error in these severity of harm findings, maintaining instead "that the First
Amendment gave them a license to engage in such conduct." Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at
1223.
260. Id. at

_,

131 S. Ct. at 1219 (majority opinion).

261. Id.
262. See supra Part IV.A.
263. See Phelps, 562 U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1222, 1223-24. (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Again, the very concept of "reasonable" in this context must take into
the account the harm caused Mr. Snyder. This would of course broaden the universe
of the reasonable.
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Nor were there other facts in this case that could reasonably
justify using Matthew Snyder's father as a signifier.2'64 First, even if no
reasonable fungible signifier alternative existed, justification must still
weigh the rights of the picketers against the right of Snyder's father not
to suffer the serious injury he suffered. It is difficult to see how Snyder's
father's right to avoid such serious injury would not trump any right of
the picketers to use him as a part of their message.
Additionally, Snyder's father was not a public figure, and thus,
no reasonable argument can exist that he was somehow entitled to
265
reduced protection on those grounds. Nor were the picketers' actions
protected by the strict limitations imposed on regulation of offensive
expression 26-they were entitled to their offensive expression but were
not entitled to use Matthew Snyder's father as a signifier of such
expression.267 Nor were restrictions on the picketers' use of Snyder's
father as signifier subject to strict scrutiny-it was not the expression but
the harm involved in "shanghaiing" Snyder's father as signifier that is
the issue in this case.268 Nor were public forum issues involved since the
picketers could have expressed their anti-gay and anti-Catholic message
on the same grounds with signifiers that did not involve the Snyder

264. In equity at least, any justification analysis should also consider the
picketers' tactics as part of a broader approach that has allowed them to "bargain"
for free airtime in exchange for their forbearance. For example, the picketers
accepted free radio airtime in exchange for not picketing the funeral of a nine-year
old girl their announcements had proclaimed "better off dead." Id. at _,
131 S. Ct.
at 1224-25.
265. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976). Even if he had been a public figure, it would not change the
fact that he was not a required signifier for the picketers' expression.
266. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1971).
267. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (on the First Amendment not
protecting violence); see also supra Part IV.B.1 (regarding the mental and physical
injuries suffered by Matthew Snyder's father).
268. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (addressing draft card
burning as symbolic speech and upholding regulations on such acts where the
government has regulation powers in the field, where important or substantial
governmental interests are advanced by such regulation, this interest is not related to
the expression, and the regulatory burden is no greater than necessary to advance this
interest).
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family.269 Nor were religious discrimination issues in play since the
picketers could have used signifiers other than Matthew Snyder's father
to advocate their message.270 Nor were any freedom of association issues
211
in play since, again, the picketers were free to march together so long
as they did not use Matthew Snyder's father as a signifier of their
message. Finally, though the picketers' actions may have been
"hyperbolic,"272 their actions were certainly not satire and somehow thus
273
protected on such grounds.
In fact, one could make the claim that speech is better served by
taking the Snyders out of the equation. If the picketers truly intended
only to claim that homosexuality is evil and that God punishes the United
States for its tolerance of homosexuality,274 and if their attacks on the
275
Snyders were truly intended to express this more general point, then
use of other signifiers than the Snyders would have expressed their
message more clearly. Their tactic basically assured that the intended and
276
Even if others
perceived meaning of their expression would diverge.
could have seen through the clamor and grasped the intended message
about the claimed dire effects of the tolerance of homosexuality, they
would almost certainly have perceived additional unintended
meanings-such as the homosexuality of the heterosexual Matthew
Snyder,277 and the exceptional nature of Matthew Snyder's case-since
the picketers chose to protest his specific funeral. This same point holds
even if one does not accept the claim that the intended message was so
limited. Even if the picketers also meant malign fallen soldiers and their
families regardless of their sexuality, independent observers would still

269. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a ban on picketing
one household rather than picketing in general).
270. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding
that a school could not discriminate against religious viewpoint in a limited public
forum it had created).
271. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (recognizing such a right).
272. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.

,

,

, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1210,

1214 (2011) (majority opinion).
273. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
131 S. Ct. at 1225-26 (Alito, J., dissenting).
274. See Phelps, 562 U.S. at _,
275. See id.
276. See supra Part II.D.
, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting).
277. See Phelps, 562 U.S. at

292

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

have been likely to perceive a claim that Matthew Snyder was
homosexual.278
Additionally, many would have also likely perceived Matthew
Snyder's situation as allegedly more egregious than the other cases since
his funeral was the funeral the picketers chose to protest. 27 9 The
perceived meaning would thus diverge from any intended meaning in
any such case. Hence, Matthew Snyder's father should have been
. .
. .280
compensated for his serious injury.
This is not to say, however, that all injurious symbolic usage of
living beings lies outside the scope of First Amendment protection. For
example, where a person used as a signifier consents to such usage and
no criminal or public policy issues demand otherwise, 281consent should
justify usage in some cases even where the human signifier suffers
substantial harm. For example, a person with an incurable, sexuallytransmitted disease might (out of a desire to help others) consent to be a
symbol of the result of unsafe sexual practices. No one could reasonably
maintain that such expression would not enjoy full First Amendment
protection even though the infected person might suffer substantial
reputational or financial harm as a result of such public exposure. In such
a case, the consensual harm to the living person would not violate
criminal law or public policy, and the message would in fact advance
sound public policy of risk education in the area of that disease.
Even where the living human used as signifier does not consent
and suffers substantial harm, there can still be cases where such
expression enjoys full First Amendment protection. Certain cases
involving public figures would be obvious examples.282 For instance, if a
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id. at _,
131 S. Ct. at 1222-23 (describing the elements for an
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim, how speech can satisfy these
elements and how the respondents did not challenge the sufficiency of the
petitioner's evidence to state such a claim). In addition to emotional distress, the
Snyder family's privacy was invaded, their personal dignity was attacked, and their
religious freedom to bury their son in the manner required by their faith also fell
under siege. See Heyman, supra note 24, at 154-57.
281. For example, the case of murder films where the victim's consent would
be no defense See, e.g., People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
282. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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congressman persistently accepts bribes, he should be fair game as a
symbol of congressional corruption even if such usage results in the loss
of his seat. Using the corrupt congressman as a signifier is permissible
because he accepted a position of public trust283 -meaning he is publicly
accountable for his actions-and because excluding the congressman as
284
a signifier would materially alter the message's idea.
Even in cases of non-public figures, First Amendment protection
can apply as well. For example, if a contractor has repeatedly criminally
swindled clients, there should be full First Amendment protection for
using him as a symbol of such corruption. He is involved in such
corruption, he has put himself within the scope of public criminal
process, and any signifier change would change the meaning of the
expression by leaving out this contractor's example.285
Admittedly, justification can be reasonably debated in endlesslyimaginable cases and its full treatment is well beyond the scope of this
article. However, justification cannot reasonably be claimed in the
crooked congressman's or crooked contractor's cases. Nor, for all the
reasons given above, can justification be reasonably claimed for the
286
symbolic signifier usage of Matthew Snyder's father.
283. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Firestone,424 U.S. 448.
284. The signifier's fungibility thus differs here from that in Phelps. If the
message in Phelps is about God's hatred, homosexuality, and the American military,
then Matthew Snyder's father is no inherent part of that message.
285. Again, therefore, such a signifier is not fungible in the way of Matthew
Snyder's father.
286. On August 6, 2012, President Obama signed legislation criminalizing
protests at military funerals within three hundred to five hundred feet of such
funerals both two hours before and two hours after such funerals. Honoring
America's Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-154, § 601, 126 Stat. 1165, 1195 (2012) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1388 (2012)). This statute was enacted after a number of state statutes were enacted
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218
on the same subject. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. _, _,
(2011) (majority opinion). Presumably this statute does not preclude further civil
restrictions and further state criminal restrictions on such protests. See Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (describing pre-emption jurisprudence, noting that
Congress' purpose is the ultimate touchstone in pre-emption cases and noting that it
is to be assumed, especially when Congress legislates in a field which the States
traditionally occupy, that state police powers are not to be superseded by federal law
unless that is Congress' clear and manifest purpose); see also Phelps, 562 U.S.
at_, 131 S. Ct. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is absolutely nothing to
suggest that Congress and the state legislatures, in enacting these laws [including an
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V. CONCLUSION
These sad decisions in Stevens and Phelps (and the unnecessary
suffering they continue to permit) demand correction. They demand
correction of flawed expression analysis that lacks necessary semiotic
depth. They demand correction of mechanical notions of law that conceal
judicial choice at forks in the road. They demand correction of claims
that dictionaries settle constitutional or statutory interpretation issues
without regard to applicable reference or focus. They demand correction
of claims that canons such as noscitur a sociis impermissibly rewrite law.
They demand much better of the Court. As noted above, perhaps the
construction principles set forth by Chief Justice Roberts in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius provide hope that the
Court will do better in future cases.287 If so, any such optimism is of
288
course tempered by Justice Alito's joining the dissent in Sebelius. In
such dissent, Justice Alito, the lone voice of reason in Stevens289 and in
Phelps, voted to strike down the Affordable Care Act because (again in
the words of Chief Justice Roberts) "Congress used the wrong labels." 290

earlier 2006 version of 18 USC § 1388], intended them to displace the protection

provided by the well-established IIED tort.").
287. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
, 132 S. Ct. 2566
288. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
(2012) (dissenting opinion).
289. In Stevens, Justice Alito adamantly maintained that the Court had "a duty
to interpret § 48 so as to avoid serious constitutional concerns, and § 48 may
reasonably be construed not to reach almost all, if not all, of the depictions that the
,
, 130 S.
Court finds constitutionally protected." U.S. v. Stevens, 562 U.S.
Ct. 1577, 1597 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
132 S. Ct. at 2597 (majority opinion).
290. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at _,

